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Snellen and Willis: In the Hour of Victory: The Royal Navy at War in the Age of Nelso

However, prospective readers might be
warned that this book would probably
not make good introductory reading to
the Cold War. Wilson takes it as his task
to relate the critical junctures and the
respective leaders’ reasoning at the cost
of communicating the overall history
of the conflict—a reasonable approach,
given the troves of work available on
the period. His portrait of Mikhail
Gorbachev is particularly interesting. He
casts a light on Gorbachev not merely
as a new thinker who offers a different
strategic perspective but as a responder
to American initiatives. Gorbachev
and Reagan shared an abhorrence of
nuclear weapons, sometimes letting
this revulsion outstrip the policies with
which their advisers were comfortable.
Wilson’s portrait of the time is an engaging one, capturing to an unusual extent
how leaders then were trying to understand each other’s motives. “In the last
years of the conflict, improvisation mattered more than any master plan.” We do
well to be reminded of this, since there
is often a temptation to look through
the lens of history and see outcomes as
certain and predictable, which is often
a mistake and the product of psychological bias rather than cold analysis.
Wilson’s book is a useful corrective in
this regard, examining how the role of
improvisation and accident can play critical parts at crucial junctures of history.
ANDREW STIGLER

Naval War College
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British author Sam Willis’s latest book,
in what is a fast-growing and impressive collection of naval historical works,
reveals new details of battles previously
immortalized, shining new light on how
these battles were conducted. Willis
titles his book aptly and in a manner appreciative of the primary source
material he has thrust forward from
obscurity. Vice Admiral Collingwood’s
first dispatch to the Admiralty after the
battle of Trafalgar begins, “The ever
to be lamented death of Vice Admiral
Lord Viscount Nelson, who in the late
conflict with the enemy fell in the hour
of victory.” The victorious Collingwood
goes on to describe for his superiors
and for the British public the circumstances that allowed twenty-seven Royal
Navy ships of the line to dominate a
larger combined French and Spanish
fleet. This book analyzes not only the
original dispatches from Trafalgar but
also those from several other great fleet
battles from 1794 to 1806. Specifically,
the author lays out original dispatches,
historical context, and skillful interpretations for the battles of the Glorious
First of June (1794), St. Vincent (1797),
Camperdown (1797), the Nile (1798),
Copenhagen (1801), Trafalgar (1805),
and San Domingo (1806). These giant
fleet engagements were remarkable in
several respects, most notably in that
they marked the last large-scale battles
of the sailing warfare era, and all represent overwhelming British victories.
This work weaves into its narrative
fascinating insights already known to
naval historians. How did Britain come
to dominate all these battles? Numerical
superiority, though normally paramount
in sailing warfare, was not enough to
help the French, Danes, Spanish, or
Dutch during this era whenever a British
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fleet seized the initiative with bold maneuver. British officers had more experience with sailing tactics. British seaman
were better trained, and their gunnery
was better. The hulls of British ships
could withstand cannon balls better,
and their rigging was more amenable to
repair. Estimates from these battles have
British seamen firing multiple broadsides to each one fired by their enemies.
However, Willis warns against presuming that the outcomes of these engagements were inevitable. He argues, with
merit, that these dispatches “remind us
of the occasions when random events
tipped the battle one way or another.”
These commanders all had choices,
which set in motion tumbling aftereffects. A change in the wind could have a
huge impact and turned well-laid plans
into chaos. Sailing warfare took a great
deal of skill but also luck, and both factors aided the British enormously during
this war-laden period of naval history.
In addition to detailing an interesting
history of these fleet showdowns, Willis
analyzes how the commanders themselves shaped history after the smoke
from the cannons had cleared. This is
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the book’s biggest contribution. Willis
examines not only their states of mind
at the time of drafting the dispatches but
also their personalities. Nelson was a
wordsmith and a self-promoter. Admiral
Duncan possessed a deep desire to
maintain the public’s respect for the Royal Navy and thus minimized confusion
of battle and negligence of subordinates.
No two commanders would describe
a battle in the same way, especially not
when they are all still damp from sweat
and sea spray, their ears still ringing
from the cannon shot, and the screams
of the injured still audible from below
decks. Moreover, writing with a quill pen
while a battered ship pitches and rolls is
not easy, particularly when one is sleep
deprived. Regardless, these scribbled
dispatches made months-long journeys
to the Admiralty and then appeared in
newspapers, where they became the first
draft of history. Willis places these dispatches into historical context and crafts
a very enjoyable narrative in the process.
LT. JEREMY SNELLEN, JAGC, U.S. NAVY
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